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The Spark of Awareness 
 
Consciousness has been an elusive topic for scientific investigation.  Each and 
every one of us is conscious day after day, so we all know what it is like to be conscious.  
But as a subject for scientific research, consciousness has proven most recalcitrant.  
Long-standing and deep-seated fears that there is something essentially unscientific about 
consciousness, have until very recently deterred most scientists from studying it.  
Consciousness has seemed too subjective, too philosophical, too religious – in short, 
hopelessly ill-defined – to be worth wasting a career on. 
 
These fears are currently under review, for one very simple reason.  Brain 
imaging technologies, such as Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), 
Electroencephalography (EEG), and Positron Emission Tomography (PET), have 
revolutionized brain research by providing near real-time visual images of the conscious 
brain at work.  Each of these techniques measures the occurrence of certain properties of 
neural activity.  EEG measures electrical wavelengths generated across the brain, some of 
which wavelengths correlate with being in deeply unresponsive states such as coma, 
some with being asleep, some with being awake and alert, and some with demanding 
emotional and cognitive activity.  FMRI measures changes in blood flow patterns in 
particular cortical regions by detecting changes in the magnetic fields generated by iron 
atoms carried in haemoglobin.  These changing blood flow patterns in local neural 
pathways correlate with particular perceptual, affective, and cognitive processes that 
characteristically come loaded with conscious feeling.  And PET measures activity of 
particular neurotransmitters that again correlate with particular kinds of perceptual, 
affective, and cognitive processes typically outfitted with conscious feeling.  PET and 
fMRI studies in particular have astonishing spatial resolution – with their use, we can 
determine that particular neural pathways in, say, ventrolateral prefrontal cortex are 
disproportionately active during language production processes and that other pathways 
in, say, the temporo-parietal region are disproportionately active during language 
comprehension processes. 
 
 The last twenty years of brain research have witnessed an orgy of PET and fMRI 
studies.  The information these studies provide has proven invaluable in helping to 
confirm that there are measurable differences between conscious and unconscious brain 
processes, and that these measurable differences are highly localizable in particular 
regions of the brain.  Hence, these two technologies demonstrate both that consciousness 
makes a difference to the way the brain works and where consciousness makes a 
difference when it makes a difference.  With this information, brain scientists, cognitive 
scientists, and philosophers of mind are beginning to map the neural correlates of 
conscious brain activity.  Although this field is currently chaotic and years away from 
providing definitive results, the combined efforts of neuroscientists working on the 
empirical side and cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind working on the 
conceptual side hold out the promise that some of the long-held prejudices against a 
science of consciousness premised on the ineliminable subjectivity of its data may soon 
become moot.  The black box of the brain has been opened, and what it is revealed is a 
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fantastically complex structure whose operational details may eventually be understood, 
even if it takes decades to accomplish the task. 
 
We are interested today not in reporting on current fMRI and PET studies, but in 
something equally difficult.  We are interested in using contemporary neuroscientific and 
evolutionary advances to understand the emergence of human consciousness and its 
neural realizing mechanisms.  The evidence base here is, admittedly, sparse.  All that’s 
left to study for the entire sweep of human development from Homo afarensis to the 
emergence of reflection on the mind 3,000 years ago, a span of 3.97 million years, is our 
pre-historic ancestors’ skulls and the artefacts that have been lucky enough to survive 
buried in the ground, submerged under water, or painted on cave walls.  The period from 
4 million years ago to 100,000 years ago is very sparsely represented: skulls and bones, 
axe heads, hearth scenes, pebbles, and some spears.  It’s not much.  But our nearest 
primate relatives, bonobos and chimpanzees, are still around as a reminder of how things 
stood neurologically (more or less) when humans first split off from the rest of the 
primate lineage, and their brains are intensively studied. 
 
Evidence from neurophysiology, comparative neurobiology, evolutionary 
psychology, and cognitive archaeology concerning brain size, architecture, and function 
across humans and primates is now extensive enough to circumscribe the functional and 
anatomical features of primate and human brain associated with consciousness.  Of 
particular interest is neocortex change in the last million years and the psychological 
enrichment correlated with that change. 
 
 I hope we can agree that human consciousness is unlike consciousness found in 
any other species.  The consciousness of no other species is as linguistically suffused, or 
as prone to monitoring, or as reflectively nuanced, or as cognitively flexible as human 
consciousness.  Such differences have been thought by many to imply that human 
consciousness is a gift from God.  But this kind of argument ignores the fact that even if 
our consciousness is unlike that found in other species, it is far from being wholly unlike 
the consciousness found in other species.  The peculiarities of human consciousness have 
precedents in the consciousness found in other species, in particular our nearest 
evolutionary ancestors, such as chimpanzees and bonobos, Homo erectus and 
Neanderthals.  To varying degrees, all of these species communicate, sometimes 
symbolically, all engage in monitoring their cognitive and emotional activity, and all 
reflect at least a little on themselves as agents.  That weakens the argument for 
supernatural origins of human consciousness. 
 
 If our kind of consciousness developed from consciousness as found in the last 
common ancestor for humans and chimps and bonobos, and if chimp and bonobo 
consciousness both lack some of the features human consciousness has, then there has to 
have been differential psychological development in the two lines since the last common 
ancestor.  No scientist or philosopher would deny this.  More controversial is the claim 
that if these new features of our consciousness are identical to or subserved by neural 
pathways for which there are inherited genotypes, then evolutionary changes subsequent 
to the split from the last common ancestor have also occurred.  The antecedent of the 
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conditional is contentious: why think that consciousness is identical to or subserved by 
neural pathways for which there are inherited genotypes?  For purposes of developing the 
arguments of this lecture, I will assume that this is true. In the conclusion, I identify a 
problem with the assumption. 
 
Were we to discuss the wide range of work on the evolution of human 
consciousness, we would be here for a very long time.  So I would like instead to focus 
on two facets of the psychological changes we have undergone and on the neural changes 
that subserve them.  First, I’d like to discuss what cognitive neuroscientists call ‘working 
memory.’  We, like many other mammals, can hold and entertain information in 
consciousness.  That’s working memory.  We are not alone in possessing working 
memory, but we are alone in being able to do so many things with the information it 
stores.  So, while working memory is not new with humans, it is, compared to other 
species, demonstrably enhanced.  In what does this enhancement consist?  That’s my first 
question.  
Second, I’d like to discuss a more specific phenomenon that sets us off from other 
primate species, namely, the development of spoken language.  No other primates speak, 
although some chimps and bonobos arguably use very basic forms of written language.  
The recursive richness of language – embedding thoughts within thoughts as I am now 
doing right now – opens up possibilities for expression previously unmet in any other 
form of animal communication.  What are the differences between us and them – 
neuroanatomical, physiological, and psychological – that allow us but not them to speak?  
That’s my second question.  
 
I:  Working memory 
 
Working memory is the set of cognitive process that allow us to hold and 
consciously entertain information.  The classical model of working memory was 
developed by Alan Baddely and others about thirty years ago.  On this model, working 
memory is composed of four functional components: a phonological loop; a visuo-spatial 
sketchpad; an episodic buffer; and a central executive.  The phonological loop is 
composed of two sub-systems, the phonological store and the articulatory loop, the first 
a temporary storehouse of sounds and the second responsible for sound production.  The 
visuo-spatial sketchpad is likewise composed of two systems, the first devoted to 
processing qualitative pattern information such as colour, texture, and shape, the second 
devoted to processing spatial location and sequential movement information. (Recent 
work suggests that there are probably as many short-term stores as there are kinds of 
information.)  The episodic buffer integrates and temporarily stores information from 
different sources as a single, bound, episode, and the central executive attends, plans, 
inhibits behaviour, makes decisions, sequences, and integrates information. 
 
Attention and planning are especially relevant for understanding consciousness.  
Attention to an experiential feature is either bottom-up, as when a salient feature imposes 
itself on our consciousness, or top-down, as when we orient to a feature of experience 
because we are interested in it.  Likewise, attention is either overt, as when we shift our 
gaze, or covert, as when we turn inward to reflect. But it is executive attention – the 
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ability to maintain or recover access to memory items – that is most qualified to be a 
requirement for improved cognition and enhanced consciousness.  Of course, even when 
conjoined with enhanced phonological and visuo-spatial storage capacity, enhanced 
executive attention is not sufficient for all of human cognitive abilities, for one of the 
characteristic features of human cognition is its ever more complex goal-direction, with 
its attendant planning. Planning utilizes working memory components that facilitate rapid 
access to goal-relevant information.  
 
II.  Speech and language 
 
The second phenomenon we discuss is spoken language.  In order to avoid 
pitfalls, let’s be clear that the term language refers to a symbolic system of 
communication and thought that has syntax and semantics.  Symbols are a species of 
sign.  A sign is a stimulus pattern that carries information or stands in for something else.  
Within the genus sign there are at least three species: icons, indexes, and symbols.  An 
icon is a visual representation of something, such as a painting or sculpture.  An index is 
a stimulus-dependent sign that correlates particular perceptual information with or points 
to – indexes – something else.  A limping gait indexes injury; a beeping car horn indexes 
danger; olfactory detection of pheremones indexes sexual availability; particular kinds of 
vocalization index danger or contentment; a wrinkled nose and scowl index disgust.  A 
symbol is a stimulus-independent sign that has a conventional significance acquired 
through association with other symbols.  That symbols have conventional significance is 
crucial: symbols, unlike indexes, bear no non-conventional relation to that which they 
signify.  Thus the national flag of a gold cross against a background of black and green is 
a symbol that refers to Jamaica; ‘s’ (an ink squiggle) may be a symbol that refers to a 
particular phoneme; ‘grief’ (a collection of ink squiggles) may be a symbol that refers to 
a particular conscious emotional state. Language is composed of symbols.  Syntax is the 
set of rules for proper formation of well-formed units in a language; semantics is the set 
of meanings of the sentences of a language. 
 
Language can be verbal or written.  We are not interested here in written language 
since its emergence is quite late in the archaeological record.  The earliest written 
languages were symbolic without being alphabetic, consisting of ideograms and 
pictograms that referred to ideas and things.  They date to 6,500 years ago (4500 BCE).  
The earliest languages to contain arbitrary symbols for words are hieroglyphics in Egypt 
and cuneiform in Mesopotamia, both from about 5,000 years ago, and, perhaps, systems 
in China as long ago as 6,000 years ago.  The earliest alphabetic language was developed 
in Egypt around 4,500 years ago (2500 BCE).  However these dates resolve, written 
language emerged long after its spoken partner had been in place.  
 
It is spoken language that is of direct interest to us today.  Again, to avoid 
misunderstanding, let us distinguish between vocalizing and speaking.  Vocalization is 
the act of producing audible motor behaviour for communication; speech is the act of 
producing audible motor behaviour for communication and expressed in language.  In a 
slogan, speech is linguistic vocalization.  So, while dogs, cats, and other mammals 
vocalize, humans speak.  “Talking” birds and other such confections produce audible 
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motor behaviour and thus vocalize, and they produce phonetically structured audible 
motor behaviour and thus appear to speak.  But they are just good phonetic mimics, and, 
while phonetically correct utterances are necessary for spoken language, they are not 
sufficient, for to them must at least be added the intention to be meaningful.  
 
III: Archaeological evidence of enhanced working memory 
 
Turning now to the archaeological evidence concerning working memory, we 
may note the following.  Enhanced working memory explains a variety of cognitive 
abilities that have left their traces in the archaeological record.  Evidence of improved 
technology, componential tool construction, sophisticated hunting and trapping 
techniques, and the appearance of representational stone carvings, all of which occurred 
between 500 KYA and 75 KYA, entails changes that distinguish our Homo ancestors 
from all earlier species and some of those changes can be explained as the consequences 
of enhanced working memory.  
 
Homo erectus – one of the earlier members of the Homo genus – appeared about 2 
million years ago.  Various other members of the genus Homo appear over the next 
million years, most of them evolutionary dead-ends.  One of the best known – the 
Neanderthals – first came on the scene about 600 KYA; Homo sapiens appear about 170 
KYA.  The evidence concerning Homo sapiens is spotty prior to 130 KYA, but 
subsequent to that time the number of bones, recovered tools, and other artifacts increases 
dramatically.  
 
Prior to about 80 KYA, there is nothing particularly notable about H. sapiens – 
like Neanderthals, we seem to have been hunter-gatherers living in kinship-based semi-
permanent camps that made hafted tools of various kinds, hunted animals, and raised 
children.  Then something happened – the cultural “Big Bang,” or “Great Leap Forward,” 
or “Symbolic Revolution,” or “Creative Explosion” or “Specialization Event,” depending 
on who is naming it.  Having done more or less the same thing in more or less the same 
way with more or less the same tools for 100,000 years, a rapid change 50 KYA 
propelled us into organisms with an extraordinarily flexible suite of behaviours and a 
highly nuanced form of consciousness.  We became who we are, Homo sapiens sapiens¸ 
humans who know that we know.  
 
Changes in tools and non-linguistic symbolic activity begin to point to the Big 
Bang’s scope.  The earliest evidence of a proliferation of new tool types, new tool 
materials, and of symbolic activity of some sort comes from the Sibudu Cave in South 
Africa and dates to 77 KYA.  Various kinds of axes, needles, fish hooks, harpoons, awls, 
hammers, and spear throwers were all developed between then and 40 KYA and were 
often sophisticated in design and elegantly constructed.  Entirely new technologies 
emerged by 30 KYA, including sewn clothing made from tanned hides, leather hut 
coverings, lamps, kilns, and weirs for catching fish. In addition, flutes, drums and other 
rhythm instruments, lunar calendars, sculpture – especially Venus figurines – 
representational art, and complex burial rituals also emerged during this time. All of these 
technological, symbolic, and representational innovations bespeak a psychology 
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significantly enhanced over Neanderthals, a psychology that was enriching 
simultaneously along affective and cognitive dimensions (primary perceptual abilities 
appear to have been conserved throughout hominine development with minor but not 
major changes).  
 
However, less complex versions of some of these technologies had been in place 
already for a long time.  Homo erectus knapped tools more than a million years ago.  
Knapping presupposes the existence of sub-acute needs and a modicum of planning, 
which in turn implies that cognitive time-depth extends both forward into the future and 
back into the past.  Although extending cognitive time-depth does not imply spoken 
communication, it does imply that visuospatial, attentional, and planning abilities had 
already developed in Homo erectus well beyond those abilities as found in other 
primates.  In particular, the symmetry exhibited by these tools is impossible to produce 
without attending to the intended shape, mentally rotating an image of the stone, and 
planning the eventual shape ahead of its production.  Planning, in turn, requires a 
representation of a state of affairs as it actually is and a counterfactual representation of a 
state of affairs as it is intended to become.  To plan, the mind must have sufficient 
computational capacity to hold both representations in mind.  The visuo-spatial sketchpad 
is clearly implicated in these new abilities.  
 
The relative stability of Homo erectus stone-tool technology over a million years 
– the last skeletal remains of Homo. erectus date to less than 200 KYA – suggests that 
they lacked cognitive developments that found expression in the tool technologies 
produced by Neanderthals, who first appear on the scene about 600 KYA.  The 
Shöningen spears from 400 KYA and various hafted weapons from 200 KYA, all 
produced by Neanderthals, are the first persuasive examples of componential tool 
construction, a multi-step production procedure some of whose modular phases can be re-
arranged.  Producing and using a Shöningen spear requires more than thirty such phases.  
Lynn Wadley has shown in an analysis of fibre and adhesive hafting practices from South 
Africa’s Sibudu cave that adhesive hafting requires days, sometimes weeks.  Both 
production processes entail ongoing planning and constantly refreshed episodes of 
executive attention and intention formation.  
 
Componential construction techniques also provide evidence that Neanderthals 
and early Homo sapiens were able to decouple satisfaction from basic need at least 400 
KYA.  With that decoupling, manufacturing tools becomes an independent goal that 
yields its own set of satisfactions.  Hence, even in the heart of the Middle Palaeolithic, 
our precursors already had enhanced executive attentional, planning, and visuo-spatial 
psychological capacities, and other complex psychological and cultural features beyond 
those found in earlier species of the genus and other primates.  Hence, their form of 
working memory is already enhanced over earlier species. 
 
IV.  Archaeological evidence of speech and language 
 
Given their complexity, the steps in componential tool production processes 
become increasingly difficult to keep track of and therefore increasingly difficult to teach 
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without some means of distal reference, recursion, ordering, and binding.  Symbol use 
fits the bill – symbols are neither tied to their referents by perceptual similarity nor bound 
to their referents by occurrent stimulus, and the recursive and binding capacities of 
symbols unlock a riot of combinatorial possibilities.  Speech – vocalized symbolic 
language – is thus a remarkably good vehicle for planning and teaching.  
 
A most telling advance introduced by H. sapiens sapiens is such a vocalized 
language.  Spoken language in the sense described above is thought now to have 
appeared first between 80 KYA and 50 KYA.  Although speech likely developed from 
vocalization, its route from the one to the other is unclear, and extending speech 
backward beyond early Homo. sapiens sapiens is still controversial.  Language origin has 
always been a highly speculative undertaking, so prone to loaded interpretation, circular 
reasoning, arguments from ignorance, non sequiturs, and red herrings that only the 
foolhardy, ideologically charged, or really brave have ever dared enter the fray.  I would 
like to introduce some of what is currently best confirmed about the origins of language 
by consulting recent comparative cognitive psychology of speech and comparative 
neurobiology of the speech regions of the brain. 
  
Vocalization is ubiquitous across primates.  Even orang-utans, who vocalize little, 
recognize conspecifics by sound.  Bonobo chimps, perhaps our closest remaining 
hominin relative, also vocalize regularly, reliably, and vociferously.  They grunt, groan, 
peep, hoot, scream, whistle, bark, pout, pant, and click in predictable ways in response to 
specific cues and in specific contexts. In addition, some bonobo vocalizations are tonally 
modulated, limited to short chunks, and organized as responses to communicative input 
from each other and from caretakers.  However, bonobo vocalization is not yet speech, 
for it is indexical rather than symbolic, stimulus-dependent rather than stimulus-
independent, and emotionally bound to motivational state rather than cognitively 
liberated from motivational state.  
   
An interesting facet of bonobo communication is that, while they don’t speak, 
they are arguably competent with words, that is, they are arguably symbol users.  Some 
bonobos have vocabularies approaching 300 words (about what a two-year old human 
child knows), and some teach conspecifics elements of what they know by showing them 
lexigrams on the computers they use to communicate with each other.  Moreover, they 
can arguably put symbols together to form more complex symbols.  At least one bonobo 
– the famous Kanzi – can distinguish between sentences such as ‘put the tomato in the 
bowl’ and ‘put the bowl on the tomato,’ which suggests that he at least may have some 
understanding of syntax and spatial and causal order.  
 
As impressive as bonobo symbol skills may be, they are still pretty poor, and 
except in captivity no bonobo has ever been known to learn symbol meaning or use 
symbols of any kind.  Even those in captivity cannot put more than a couple of symbols 
together and cannot speak using those symbols. There is, it is true, ongoing vocal 
commentary when bonobos engage in their lexical activities, but these vocalizations are 
indexical supplements or adjuncts to shared activity rather than a vehicle for 
communicating shared meaning.  
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Still, unlike talking seals and parrots, enculturated bonobos are more than mimics 
and appear to mean something by what they do with their lexically-keyed computers.  
Moreover, that some bonobos engage in symbolically loaded and proto-grammatical 
activities without speech suggests that for them the ability to speak is not necessary for 
symbol use.  At least in enculturated bonobos, the cognitive abilities required for 
engaging in symbolic activity do not appear to depend causally upon speaking ability. 
 
Considerable uncertainty attaches to the best of the bonobo studies, more still to 
earlier gorilla, chimp, and dolphin studies.  For example, those arguing for the existence 
of bonobo language have been accused of over-interpreting evidence to demonstrate 
semantic and grammatical competence.  After all, symbolic competence is not yet 
semantic or grammatical competence. Language, unlike discrete symbol use, is recursive 
– it loops back on itself and embeds clauses within clauses (as in this sentence) – and it is 
almost uncontrollably productive.  While competence in assigning a referent object to a 
symbol is necessary for recursion and productivity, the latter also require the ability to 
compositionally embed and extend discrete linguistic units.  Children over two years in 
age are already more advanced than the most advanced bonobo at comprehending and 
constructing grammatically complex and semantically rich utterances.  
 
V.  Comparative neuroanatomical and paleoneurological evidence  
 
To this point we have focused on cognitive-psychological developments rather 
than on neural developments.  But if cognitive capacities are underwritten by neural 
processes, then where there are cognitive developments, we should expect to find neural 
developments as well.  As surprising as it may perhaps seem, there is now 
paleoneurological evidence about some neural developments subsequent to the split from 
the last common ancestor to us and chimps.  This evidence can be compared to what we 
know about the neural pathways that subserve working memory processes and language 
in us now.  With what is known from comparative neurobiology of bonobo and chimp 
brains, the result is a set of data that is increasingly complete on both ends of the 
development route and that, while partial for the intervening period, contains glimpses of 
brains changing their shape, their configuration, and their function.   
 
Working memory 
 
Given space limitations, we constrain discussion of working memory neural 
pathways to those subserving hearing. In humans, auditory processing follows two neural 
pathways from the temporo-parietal region of the brain.  The first is the dorsal ‘where’ 
pathway, which connects early stages of auditory processing in the temporo-parietal 
region to dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex via a huge bundle of white 
matter neurons called the arcuate fasciculus.  The second is that the ventral ‘what’ 
pathway that connects the same temporo-parietal region to ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 
via another bundle of white matter neurons called the uncinate fasciculus.  
 
Although in humans both dorsal and ventral pathways connect to ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex (for those who know these designations, at Broadmann areas 44 and 45 
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(Broca’s area)), evidence suggests that distinct sub-regions separately process dorsal and 
ventral information.  It is generally thought that activity in the ventral pathway and 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex is the neural correlate of working memory’s articulatory 
rehearsal loop.  The neural basis of the phonological store is activity in the dorsal 
pathway of inferior parietal cortex and posterior superior temporal cortex.  This dorsal 
pathway is also correlated with syntactical abilities to parse sentential units and 
hierarchical grammatical structures.  
 
One of the notable differences between us and noisy but speechless monkeys and 
chimps is that in them there are well-developed ventral pathways but only incipiently 
developed dorsal pathways.  Monkeys and chimps lack a developed supramarginal gyrus 
(Broadmann area 40) and an angular gyrus (Broadmann area 39).  In addition, the bundle 
of myelinated white matter tracts known as the arcuate fasciculus has changed its 
connectivity pattern. In comparison to monkeys, the human arcuate fasciculus is 
significantly enlarged and its connectivity to ventrolateral prefrontal cortex has 
strengthened, while its connectivity to the frontal eye fields has become weakened.  
 
To this evidence may be added another piece, this piece coming from 
palaeontology.  Recent work shows pretty clearly that there has been an unexpected 
growth in inferior and superior parietal and frontopolar regions through Homo erectus, 
neanderthalis, and sapien sapiens.  As the human line developed over the last two million 
years, brains become bigger than expected.  Moreover, they don’t just get bigger; they get 
bigger in particular areas, the result being a brain that, in comparison to chimps and 
bonobos, is less egg-shaped and more globular.  
 
As just noted, among the parietal regions experiencing such unpredicted 
expansion is the supramarginal gyrus.  But it is at least as significant that superior 
parietal regions have also expanded, for these regions are correlated with visual and 
sensorimotor association, covert and overt orienting, and abstract logical and 
mathematical thought.  Mesulam suggested almost thirty years ago that it is in this region 
that our spatio-visual map of the world is cobbled together, thus also implicating these 
regions in the emergence of subjectivity and synchronic self-unity.  Likewise, frontopolar 
(Broadmann areas 9, 10, and 46) expansion has also been unpredictably dramatic.  
Although frontopolar function is not as well understood as that of some other cortical 
regions, it is generally thought to correlate with planning, organization, logical thought, 
and cognitive inhibition.  
 
In short, palaeo-neurobiological evidence supports the claim that cognitive 
processes that appear to be uniquely well-developed in humans are correlated with 
neurological changes to cortical regions and neural circuits that also appear to be unique 
to humans.  This evidence is significantly stronger than the ‘just-so’ stories and reverse 
engineering palaeo-fantasies one sometimes finds in related disciplines investigating the 
evolutionary development of human psychological abilities.  When coupled with the 
archaeological evidence, the case for neurally-grounded working memory enhancement 
looks fairly robust. 
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Language 
 
A similar neurological and comparative anatomical story can be told about 
speech.  Comprehension of heard speech universally involves activation of neural 
pathways in superior temporal and posterior parietal cortex (what is known as 
‘Wernicke’s Area’) and speech production always involves neural pathways ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex (what is known as ‘Broca’s Area’), pre-motor, and motor cortex.  Care 
must be taken to avoid thinking that evidence for one is also evidence for the other. All of 
the hominin language studies prior to those in the 1990s conflate these abilities.  Recent 
bonobo studies account for the distinction and are the first to offer credible evidence that 
species other than H. sapiens sapiens comprehend and communicate with symbols, even 
if they do not do so using speech.  These studies are not, however, definitive.  
 
It is also noteworthy that our vocal tract differs from that found in other hominins.  
We lack, and our chimpanzee-like ancestors had, air sacs in their throats (which helped 
them produce exceptionally loud calls), and we have, and both our chimpanzee-like 
ancestors and Homo erectus lacked, an enlarged hypoglossal canal and a descended 
larynx.  Our hypoglossal canal, through which the nerve that activates the tongue is 
located, is much larger than a chimp’s, and evidence suggests that Neanderthal 
hypoglossal canals were the earliest species to have one that is about the same size as 
ours.  That suggests that at least one part of human vocal tract has been relatively 
unchanged for more than 400,000 years.  
 
An enlarged hypoglossal canal is not sufficient for speech if some other feature is 
also necessary and undeveloped, and that’s the case with human speech production.  It 
turns out that for articulated speech, a descended larynx is required.  A descended larynx 
helps us produce sounds that no other primate can produce.  Consider ‘mate,’ ‘mat,’ 
‘meet,’ ‘met,’ ‘might,’ ‘mit,’ ‘mote,’ ‘mute,’ ‘moot,’ ‘maud,’ and ‘mod.’  We produce 
and recognize these different sounds with precision and ease; it’s physically impossible 
for other primates.  The descended larynx is directly relevant for identifying differences 
between us and our hominin ancestors, for it is a matter of debate whether Neanderthal 
larynx was descended.  Suppose it was – it doesn’t immediately follow that Neanderthals 
could produce anything more than a limited variety of vowel and consonant sounds.  
Suppose they couldn’t – could they then have had a spoken language? This debate has 
reached such fine grain that one of the most important questions now is whether a 
particular tiny bone – the hyoid, which helps to control tongue movement – does or does 
not demonstrate a descended larynx in Neanderthals.  The jury is still out.  
 
Proto-speech – individual word-like vocal chunks with conventionally agreed-
upon significance – may, as some think, have distilled out of facial expressions and 
gestures, but even if early H. sapiens and Neanderthals were not capable of speaking, 
they may have been cognitively and neurally sophisticated enough to think symbolically.  
The evidence of pigment use and componential tool construction are particularly 
suggestive in this regard, although not conclusive.  After all, it is one thing to dab oneself 
with pigment, to understand how to make a hafted tool, and to teach another how to do 
these things; it is quite another to comprehend symbols or to use them to communicate.  
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Certainly, similarities exist between the cognitive prerequisites for both families 
of abilities.  Just as applying pigment to oneself requires enhanced spatial working 
memory, so teaching another how to apply pigment requires enhanced spatial working 
memory.  One can even attribute enhanced phonological storage as a requirement for 
communicating what must be imparted to an apprentice toolmaker.  But it doesn’t follow 
from those requirements that the medium for communication was symbolic.  Perhaps it 
was; perhaps it wasn’t – the evidence to date is consistent with both. It’s possible then 
that speech and language developed together in tandem; that they developed 
independently but parallel to one another; that language developed out of proto-speech; 
or even that speech developed out of proto-language.  Possibility is not actuality, and we 
will just have to wait for more evidence before declaring one option preferable to others.  
 
What is at this point established is that all of the above considerations must go 
into an answer.  Perhaps H. sapiens sapiens and Neanderthals are not distinguished at all 
– they too spoke as we do, they too had all of the same neural pathways and 
psychological abilities that we have, albeit in less developed forms (whatever that 
means).  Perhaps, on the other hand, their larynx was not descended and their hyoid bone 
was ill-positioned for complex sound production but they had all of the other 
psychological abilities and neural pathways we have and used symbolic gestures.  
Perhaps they had a descended larynx and a properly placed hyoid and had all the same 
neural pathways as we do, but lacked other well developed cognitive abilities or 
emotions.  Perhaps they had a descended larynx, a properly placed hyoid, well developed 
working memory and emotion, but did not yet have Broca’s area (or Wernicke’s area) 
wired as ours is wired.  Again, we do not know, and we won’t know until more work in 
archaeology, comparative neuroanatomy, neuropsychology, genetics, and ethology 
provide more evidence. 
 
VI.  Working memory, language, and consciousness 
 
A whirlwind tour through recent neuroscience, archaeology, and comparative 
neurobiology of working memory and speech comprehension and production such as the 
one I have just provided is bound to result in numbness and exhaustion.  One may well 
wonder, what does all of this scientific evidence have to do with explaining human 
consciousness?  How do these cognitive changes in working memory and neurological 
changes in the pathways that subserve its components relate to changes in consciousness? 
In these concluding remarks, I’d like to focus on this question. 
 
As I see it, there are four alternatives.  First, working memory just is 
consciousness; second, some features of working memory are identical to some features 
of consciousness; third, while not identical to one another and while neither is reducible 
to the other, working memory and consciousness are closely related in some other way.  
Fourth, working memory is not related to consciousness at all and changes in the former 
imply nothing about changes in the latter. If any of the first three options is true, then the 
fourth is false.  But note too that if any of the first three is true and if there have been 
changes to our form of working memory, then there have been changes to our form of 
consciousness.  
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Some cognitive scientists are already prepared to identify working memory with 
consciousness.  For example, the global workspace model of consciousness proposed by 
Bernard Baars makes just such a claim.  Baars straightforwardly identifies the global 
workspace of consciousness as working memory’s central executive.  The core idea of 
the global workspace model is that a psychological event is conscious if it is widely 
available for other cognitive processes.  As Baars puts it in a recent article, the global 
workspace theory is,  
 
… a fleeting memory capacity that . . . allow[s] a theater architecture to operate in 
the brain, in order to integrate, provide access, and coordinate the functioning of 
very large numbers of specialized networks that otherwise operate autonomously” 
(Baars 2005, p. 46-47). 
 
This fleeting memory capacity is functionally equivalent to working memory.  
Hence, it’s not possible that working memory capacities could fail to be implicated in 
explanations of consciousness, and the case is made that changes in the former entail 
changes in the latter. 
 
Second, even if working memory and consciousness are distinct across certain 
dimensions, some of working memory’s components are identical with some features of 
consciousness.  After all, working memory’s central executive houses all of the cognitive 
and meta-cognitive capacities – top-down attention, metacognition, monitoring, higher-
order thought, rational thought, planning, self-consciousness, behavior inhibition, error 
correction, and so forth – routinely implicated in discussions of unique features of human 
consciousness.  Again, it is hard to see how working memory capacities could fail to be 
implicated in explanations of consciousness, so, again, changes in the former imply 
changes in the latter. 
  
Of course, one might not accept the global workspace model of consciousness and 
one might not accept that consciousness has anything to do with executive function.  For 
example, one might opt for some species of Edelman and Tononi’s dynamic core model 
of consciousness, according to which consciousness integrates, or binds, perceptual, 
cognitive, affective, interoceptive, and proprioceptive information into a single, 
subjectively-centred scene or experience but is not yet an executive system.  On this 
model, consciousness is subserved by reverberatory activity in thalamocortical and 
reentrant bidirectional cortical circuits.  Still, working memory’s episodic buffer has just 
this function, so, again, a feature of working memory is functionally equivalent to a 
model of consciousness, and, again, changes in that feature of working memory entail 
changes in access consciousness. 
 
Whichever option one chooses among at least the presented three, there are 
interesting relations between working memory and consciousness.  So, as claimed, 
changes in working memory and its neural substrates in the parietal and frontopolar 
regions in the past 1.5 million years imply changes in our form of consciousness. 
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Some investigators have held that consciousness presupposes language.  But if the 
empirical work discussed herein is heading in the right direction, it is more plausible to 
hold that language presupposes consciousness.  Language requires that we mean 
something by what is spoken, moreover, that we mean it in the way that a symbol refers 
to or represents something.  That is, language requires that our symbols be about 
something else, that they represent something.  Behaviourists, to the contrary, this is not 
possible without consciousness.  Since there is no language without meaning, no meaning 
without symbolic representation, and no symbolic representation without consciousness, 
there is no language without consciousness. 
 
One difficult question about working memory is, then, when did it first become 
sufficiently nuanced to support symbolic representation?  I admit that I don’t know, but it 
seems plausible to suggest that the answer is, no later than the Neanderthals, for at least 
rudimentary forms of representation seem to be in place by then.  Neanderthals appear to 
have sufficiently complex instructional needs to require symbolic activity and sufficiently 
complex social structure to support conventional meaning. 
 
Another question is this: when symbolic representation first emerged, what neuro-
cognitive features of the brain, if any, subserved that feature?  An answer to that question 
is not possible without knowing what, if anything, subserves symbolic representation in 
us now.  And here I will report that contemporary neuroscience has yet to provide much 
of an answer.  In part, this is because symbolic representation is complex – it’s not just 
hearing or seeing a symbol, but hearing or seeing a symbol as a symbol that has to be 
explained. So identifying auditory and visual pathways is not enough.  The current 
stumbling block in neuroscience is trying to determine what else has to be tossed into the 
phenomenon of symbol understanding and production before their neural correlates can 
be mapped.  This is among the most chaotic areas in neuroscience. Suppose those 
additional parameters are known and the neural correlates of symbolic representation are 
identified.  Then we can project their emergence back in time.  Until then, however, we 
can’t do much more than speculate. 
 
For the time being, work continues on these and many other topics related to 
consciousness that I cannot discuss here.  It is an exciting time to be a philosopher of 
mind and a neuroscientist.  Given the frenzy of neuroimaging activity in the last twenty 
years and the increasing interest in scientific studies of consciousness, it’s clear that we 
have finally reached a point where we can study consciousness as a natural phenomenon.  
We don’t yet know the outcome of this undertaking.  We may conclude in years to come 
that consciousness is not a natural phenomenon after all.  But if we do so conclude, that 
conclusion will be the hard-won result of knowing with much greater precision than 
currently available what features of consciousness cannot be woven into the fabric of 
science.  
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